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International Competition and the Unionized Sector
ABSTRACT
Thispaper studies the wage and employment behaviorof a unionized
sector that is confronted by an intensification of international competition.
After developing a formal model of a monopoly union subject to majority rule,
I study the response of a unionized sector operating under a seniorityrule
for layoffs and rehires to a trend decrease in the international priceof
its output. Conditions are provided to validate the casual argumentthat
majority voting in unions and the seniority system together providean
explanation for the lack of union wage adjustment.
A modified version of the model allows the job queue to deviatefrom a
strict seniority ranking. In this context I ask, what importance canbe







International competition which takes the form of a decline in the
price of a substitute foreign good often effects an increase in the level
of industry unemployment, while sectoral wages are "sticky downward".
This observation has led trade theorists to extend to an open economy con-
text a model first developed by Harris and Todaro (1970), which incorporates
a sector—specific rigid wage and associated industry—specificunemployment.1
This model has been used extensively to investigate appropriate policy
responses to international competition in this second—best setting.
A deficiency coon to most of these analyses is that the level of the
rigid wage is exogenously specified, and its cause is rarely discussed.For
justification, appeal is sometImas made to the pressures of unions, but no
attempt is made to model the union behavior that might giverise to the
observedwagestickiness.2 At a more informallevel, however, an explanation
for this phenomenonhas been suggested. It is casually argued that in the
faceof increased international competition union wages donot fall because
unionvotes are swayedby senior workers for whom the probability of layoff
isquite small.3
The purpose ofthis paperis to investigate the wage andemployment
behaviorof a unionized sector that is confronted by international competition.
Two questionsare addressed. First,howwill a unionized sector operating
under a seniorityrulefor layoffs andrehiresrespond to a trend decrease
in theinternational priceof its output? Second, what importance can be
attached to the seniority system in determiningthis response? In other
words,would wages respond more flexibly if criteria other thanseniority
extered into the layoff decision?—2—
To answer these questions, a model of the unionized sector that I
have developed in Grossman (1982) is adapted to an open economy setting.
The salient features of this model, which is reviewed in Section II, are
that (i) layoffs and rehires are based on seniority; (ii) the union
wage demand emerges from a majority vote among union members; and (iii) the
membership of the union is determined simultaneously with the wage demand
by a free—entry condition. In Section III I apply this model to study how
a fall in the international price of the sector's output will affect wages,
union size and industry unemployment. Then in Section IV the model is
extended to allow factors other than seniority to influence the order of
layoffs, and I study how thischangein specification alters the behavior of
the union in response to international competition.
II. THE MODEL
This section develops the basic model of the unionized sector which I
shall use in the following sections to investigate the effects of international
competition. The model presented here modifies that in Grossman (1982) to
allowforthe existence of an internationally traded good which ubstitutes
perfectly for the output of the unionized sector.
Consider, then, a small open economy that comprises two sectors. The
outputs of both sectors areinternationallytraded, andtheworld prices are
taken to be exogenous. In the nonunion sector, which is intentionally made
assimple.aspossible, the riumeraire good, X, is produced by labor alone,
according to a constant returns to scale technology. One unitof good X
is assumed to require l/ units of labor, so that w is the prevailing wage
in the nonunion sector by the zero—profit condition.—3—
The union—sector good has international price p*. Letting v(p, w)
be the indirect utility function of all workers, the utility of nonunion
labor is given by v(p*, w). To further simplify the analysis of the wage
demands of the union, I assume that the union good constitutes a negligible
fraction of the consumption basket. Thus, the indirect effect of
international competition (i.e. changes in p*) on worker's utility as a
function of consumption behavior can be ignored, and we concentrate instead
on its direct effects on the factor income of union members. With this
assumption, the utility of nonunion workers is now written simply as v(') E v.
Output in the union sector requires labor and sector—specific capital.
The production function for good Y is
YOF(K, E) (1)
where K is the fixed stock of sector—specific capital, E is the level of
sectoral employment, and 8 is a stochastic variable, assumed to be uniformly
distributed on (B —1,B]. 8 represents a random element in the production
technology,andtherefore the demand for labor, which is assumed to be unknown
at the time oflabor negotiations. Uncertainty is resolved prior to the
time that hiring andoutputdecisions are made, but while8 isthenknown
byfirmsit isunobservable by workers duringthecurrentcontractperiod.
This implies that incentive compatible contracts cannot be state contingent,
forotherwise firms would always plead an unfavorable draw of 8 to extract
concessions from the union.
I assume that all workers have identical skills, and that job sharing
is ruled out with reference to a non—conved.ty in the technology. Then E
represents the number of jobs in addition to the labor input. Define—4—
f(E) F(K, E)/9E, with decreasing returns to labor for fixed capital
input implying that f'(E) <0.Then the marginal value product of labor
is given by p*Of(E).
Theunion in this sectoris assumed to have monopoly power vis—a—vis
the largenumber of perfectly competitive firms in the industry.4 The
union specifies a state—independent wage, referred to as the wage demand,
subject to the constraint imposed by the demand—for—labor schedule. Firms
choose the level of employment once the state of nature is realized. Note
that this latter assumption does imply some limitation on the monopoly
power of the union, for otherwise the union could demand a wage—employment
package as "take—it—or—leave—it", subject only to a zero—profit constraint.
The specification that the union chooses the wage and the firm selects
E(G) is admittedly somewhat ad hoc, but has the virtue of according well
with observed behavior.5
Union members are indexed by ie [0, U, where L is the size of the
union. The index i represents seniority, with i0 the most senior member
and iL the least senior, and all workers are aware of their location in
the seniority quene. It is assumed in this section and the next that layoffs
and rehires are based solely on seniority. This assumption will be relaxed
in Section IV.
Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile ex ante, i.e. workers have the
choice whether to enter the union sector (given their seniority ranking) or
accept employment in thenonunionsector. Thus, I suppose that ex ante
there is free entry into the union. This assumption is best justified if we
think of an industrial (as opposed to craft) union operating in a multi—
period world, of wh..ch the present paper studies one representative period.
Then any worker whQis offered employment in some period (i.e. for somerealization of 0) must be admitted into the union according to U.S. law
which forbids "closed shops." Workers who are never offered employment by
any firm need not be permitted to become union members, but these workers
are of no concern because they would not choose to enter the union sector
given the alternative of nonunion employment.
Once the contract period has begun, i.e. ex post, labor is completely
immobile. This means that all workers who do not gain employment: in the
union sector once the state of nature is realized remain unemployed for
the duration of the contract period.6 Unemployment in this model, as in
the Harris—Todaro model, is industry specific and its proximate cause is
the state—independent wage in conjunction with the assumed ex pos:t
immobility of labor. It is not claimed that either the union or the seniority
system is the cause of the unemployment. It is nonetheless interesting to
study how the industry—specific unemployment described here is affected by
international competition.7
The final assumption of the model concerns the process by which the
union generates its wage demand. Following Atherton (1973) and especially
Farber (1978), I suppose this process to be one of majority voting. Iii
principle the union might. then choose an entire wage schedule with payment
a. function of placeinthe seniority ueue, In this way the union could act
asa discriminating monopolist. However, such wage schedules are ruled
out by appeal. to their high cost of negotiation.8 Thus, the union demand
that emerges froa the majorityvoteis by assumption a single wage payable
to all employed workers during, the contract period. Since union member
preferences are single—peaked, a unique voting equilibrium exists, and the
wage demanded is the one that maximizesthe utilityof the median (interms
of seniority) worker.9—6--
It is now straightforward to describe the equilibrium in this
economy. The probability of employment of a union member with seniority




The expected utility of a worker with index i is
u(i) ir. v(w) + (1 —
(2)
(3)
where v is the utility associated with unemployment, deriving from
unemployment benefits, trade adjustment assistance and leisure.
The union maximizes the utility of the median worker, who has
The solution to this in'riTn{zation is illustrated in Figure 1. The
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curvesderiving from (3), for any given worker, are downwardsloping
andconvex.Utility is maximizes where the constraint relating thewage
to probability of employment, as expressed in (2), istangent to the
indifference curve.
The union's wage demand depends on who is the medianworker, and
therefore on the size of the union. Referringonce again to Figure 1,
we see that a less senior worker with indexi1 > faces a worse trade-
off between wage and probability of employment, andprefers a lower wage.
More formally, the first order condition for the maximizationof the utility
of the median worker is
EBp*f(L/2) —w]v'(w)=v(w)—v (4)
The median worker is just indifferent between an increase inwage, which
raises utility in employed periods, and the accompanying decrease in the
probability of employment.
If the union wereto expand insize slightly, then the "new" median
worker,who isless senior then the "old" median, and therefore marginally
more concerned with his employment prospects,will prefer a slightly lower
wage. This relationship between unionsizeand the wage demand is termed
the votingschedule, and depicted as the downward sloping curve, VV, in
Figure 2. The curve has slope
dv B/2p*f'(L/2) < dL v(w)-v
°R+2
Wv' (w)
where R is the coefficient of relative risk aversion defined to be positive.
When risk averion is great, so that a marginal increase in the probability of—8—
unemployment has a large negative
the same most—preferred wage, and
w
effect on utility, workers have approximately




The second equilibrium relationship follows from the exante perfect
mobility assumption. With free entryintothe unionsectorthe least
senior worker must be indifferent between the utility he achieves by
joining the union andthatavailable to himinthe nonunion sector)0
Thismembersschedule is givenby
v(w) +(1-L'o










This is negative in the neighborhood of the VV curve, because an increase
in wage lowers the utility of the least senior worker (who is most concerned
with employment prospects) and causes the union to contract.
Equations (4) and (5) together determine the allocation of resources
between the unionandnonunion sectors, the wage in the union sector, and
the employment (and hence unemployment) there in all states of nature. The
equilibrium shown in Figure 2 is stable under the assumption that the wage
adjusts according to the voting schedule and the union size adjusts according
to the membership schedule, so long as the curve is steeper than the VV
curve. I assume this to be the case throughout.
III. TBE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL COETITION
We are now prepared to answer the first question raised in the introduction
namely: what effect does a. permanent increase in international competition
have on the long—run equilibrium in an industrywithunionized workers anda
layoff and rehire rule based solely onseniority? To do so, we perturb
theequilibrium described in Section II by chaning theinternationalprice
ofthesector's output to a new (and lower) level, pp + dp*.
Theintensification of international competition affects both the voting
andmembership schedules. Thefall in p*, ceteris paribus decreases the
probability ofemploymentof the original median worker at the intial
equilibrium wage. Therefore, at thenew price, the originalmedian worker
prefers a lower wage, to partiallyoffset this worsening of hisemployment— 10—
w
Figure 3: International Competition Lowers the Most—Preferred Wage
prospects (see Figure 3). The upshot is a downward shift of the VV schedule






where a circumflex indicates a proportional derivative. Note that a sufficient
condition for the fall in the most—preferred wage of a given worker to less
than fully compensate for the price decline, is R >1.In thiscase the
real wage rises and the probability of employmentfalls(as drawn in
Figure 3).
It; will prove useful below to have the expression for the leftward





where (i)=—if'(i)If(i), the elasticity of the marginal product of labor
schedule. We can interpret this expression as the amount that the union
would have to shrink such that the smaller union, with a more senior median
worker,.would vote for the same wage at the lower international price as the
larger union did at the initial price. Note that c(E) is the reciprocal of
the elasticity of demand for labor, so that the leftward shift of the VV
curve is just this elasticity evaluated at the point where the median
worker is marginally employed.
The trend worsening of the industry's condition also causes the union
toshrink (at a given wage). Given the wage, the decrease in employment
probability of the original least senior worker lowers his expected
utility and causes him to leave the union sector. The result is a leftward
shift of the NM schedule (see Figure 4) given by
L 1
NM, dw—O
where we recognize that l/(L) is the elasticity of demand for labor at the
point where the least senior worker is just employed. If the demand for labor
is elastic (i.e. the marginal, product schedule is inelastic). Then as the
price fallsthedecline in employment in any given state of nature will be
large,theprobabilityofemployment forless senior workers will decrease
precipitously, and the NMcurvewill shiftby a large amount.— 12—
V
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Figure 4: Effect of International Competition on
Unionized Sector Equilibriun
Evidently, international competition has two offsetting effects on
the equilibrium wage rate in the unionized sector. On the one hand, a
union of given size will vote for a lower wage because at least some of the
workers will find that the likelihood of their being laid off has increased.
But at thesametime, international competition tends ceteris paribus to
causethe union tocontract,leaving a union of higher (on average) seniority,
which therefore tends to vote fora higher wage.The net effect is ambiguous,
buthas an interesting interpretation.
It is straightforward to show (by total differentiation of (4)and (5)),
that
w sgn{-}.sgn {e(L) —c(L/2)}
V
\— 13—
When(L) >c(L/2)the leftward shift of the VV curve is greater than
the leftward shift of the MM curve, and a lower union—sector wage obtains
in the new equilibrium. In this case the effect of the international
competition on the employment prospect of the median worker exceeds the
effect on tha.t of the least senior worker. It can be shown that R >1
is sufficient for wages to fail proportionately less than does the inter-
national price, i.e. that the wage adjustment is less than complete. Since
employment and hence output in any state of nature is a decreasing
function of the real wage, this condition guarantees a normal output—price
response.
When c(L/2)c(L), as certainly holds, for example, if the labor
demand schedule has constant elasticity, the long—run wage in the unionized
sector is completely inelastic with respect to changes in the price of the
good produced in the sector. In this case all adjustment to international
competition takes place through movements of workers into and out of the
sector. Whereas the short—run wage within a contract period is rigid by
assumption, the constant elasticity of labor demand case gives rise here
to a long run wage in the sector that is endogenously sticky.11
Finally, if c(L/2) >e(L)the wage will actually rise when the price
falls, forcing even greater adjustment in the size of the sector. In this
case the decline in each worker's individual inost—perferred wage is more than
offset by theincreasein the median seniority of the union. A majority of
themore senior union is sufficiently less concerned with layoffs that a
higher wage demand emerges from the union vote.
Itis perhapsuseful to relate the conditions on the elasticity of the
marginalproductof labor schedule to the parameters of the underlying pro-
duction function in the industry. Consider the case where that function has— 14—
constantelasticity of substitution, a, between capital and labor. Then
partial wage adjustment occurs for a <1,wage movement in the opposite
direction from that of prices occurs for a >1,and endogenous wage stickiness
corresponds to the Cobb—Douglas (a1) case.
The adjustment of union size in response to international competition
is given by the solution, after totally differentiating (4) and(5), for
L/p*. As can be seen from the diagram (Fig. 4), an increase in union size is
possible only if the leftward shift of the VV curve is much greater than that
of the MM curve, and if the VV curve is relatively steep. The algebra confirms
this, and shows the (L/2) (L) or R >1is sufficient foi the union
to shrink. Only iftheelasticity of substition between capital and
laboris very low and workers are very tolerant of risk can the union
expand when competition intensifies.
A final variable of interest is the unemployment rate in the industry.
Unemployment occurs because the wage is rigid withinthe contract period,
andexpost mobility is absent. Thus, unemployment is a function most
directly of thevaluetaken by the random technology variable. However,
changes intheextent of international competition influence the level of
industry unemployment for anygivenrealization of the random variable,
viatheir affect onboththe supply of and demand for labor in thesector.
Definethe industryunemploymentrate in state of nature 8 as
z(8)=max{O,[L. —E(8)]/L}.Thenfor periods inwhichunemployment is
positive we have
*dz(8)E(6) 1(-1)1 (5) pp* L
L*
c(E(8))* J
Considerfirst the Cobb—Douglas case, for which the elasticity of the marginal— 15—
productof labor schedule is constant. Then a fall in the international
price causes the union to contract by (lI)dp*. But since in this case,
as we have seen, the wage rate remains constant, labor demand in every state
of nature also falls by (1/s)dp*. Thus, when the production function is
Cobb—Douglas, international competition has no effect on the rate of industry
unemployment in the unionized sector in anystateof nature.
For more general production functions the analysis is rather eomplicated.
After substitution in (5), it can be shown that
2 w[v(w) -v
dzO) o ____ si{dp*
=sgn (R —1)(1 —(E) v (w)
+ W2[V(W), -v][1 -____
+Bp*f(L/2) [Bp*f(L) —w]wv'(w)[1 —
IfR is large arid (E) is an increasing (decreasing) function (e.g. a < 1
(> 1) in the CEScase)then the industry unemployment rate is likely to
increase (decrease) when p* falls in all states of nature except those with
nearly fuJi.employment.Unfortunately, not much more canbesaid about
unemployment, even in the CES case.
To stmmirize,we have seen thatcasual arguments to the effect that
union voting behavior gives rise to wage stickiness in the face of inter—
ntational competition mayindeedcontain an element of truth for some
production technologies. In fact, for unionized sectors with elasticities
of substitution between labor and other fixed factors greater than one, the
direction ofunionwage movement canbeopposite to that of the price of the
sector's output.Inthese cases large adjustments in sectoral allocation— 16—
oflabor are necessitated, with the attendant political problems. For
almost all reasonable parameter values international competition does
cause the union sector to contract, a plausible conclusion regarding
resource reallocation. Finally, a permanent change in international
competition mayincrease,decrease or leave unchanged the average long—
run rate of industry unemployment.
IV. DOES THE SENIORITY RULECONTRIBUTETO WAGE STICKINESS?
Can the blame for wage sluggishness in unionized sectors following a
fall in the internationaj. price be attributed to the seniority system?
In order to answer this question we must investigate the behavior of a
unionized sector which is in every way identical to that studied in the
preceding sections, expect as regards the extent to whidh seniority rules
layoff decisions.
Suppose workers are indexed by i representing seniority, as before, but
let i€[6, L —5],so that the most senior worker has index S.Assumethat
there are LIL —2workers with each seniority index,and therefore a total
union membership of L.
Now let the order of layoffa and rehires be indexed by j, with the
job quene running from j=O to jL. We assumed in the previous sections
that the seniority ordering was identical to the job queue, but here we.
wish to modify this assumption to allow for the possibility that other
criteria enter employnt decisions. Suppose that a worker with seniority
index i has a job queue index somewhere between ji —and j =i+S,
andthat every, union member has a uniform subjective prior over this range
defined in part by his seniority ranking. Then the larger is ô the smeller
is the role of seniority in the determination of the employmentordering.12— 17 —
Itake 6 as a measure of the (decreasing) extent of seniority rule.
The voting and membership schedules are analogous to those above. A
union member with seniority index i has a subjective probability of
employnt, given the wage, of
i-kS
1 _______ = J [B-
p*f(j)
)dj (6)
The voting schedule is derived by maximizing the expected utility of the
median worker, who still has index i =L/2,with respect to the choice
of wage. The membership schedule equates the expected utility of the
least senior worker, who has index i =L—5,to the utility of employment
in the nonunion sector. The equations for the vv and 1M curves, analagous






1L {B -w/p*f(j)} dj][v(w) -vi=- v (8)
L—26
Weare now in a position to pose formally the question raised at the
outset of this section. The responsiveness of wages to price changes is
givenbydw/dp*. If the seniority system contributes to the failure of
wages to adjust to internationalcompetitionthen we should find
d2w/dp*dd > 0. Alternatively, if this cross second derivative is negative,
then we mustconcludethat the seniority system actually contributes to
wage adjustment.18 —
Itis tedious but straightforward to show that13
2dw dw sgn{} =
Inwords, the seniority system (or more precisely, a marginal increase
in reliance on seniorityforlayoff decisions) contributes to wage
sluggishness in the face of increased international competition if and only
if for a given international price the seniority system also causes a
higher sectoral wage to obtain than would otherwise. This latter issue was
investigated in Grossman (1982), so the results and intuition for that
analysis will only be reviewed briefly here.
An increase in the importance of seniority unambiguously shifts the
MM curve to the left. At a given wage the least senior worker, who
obviously can be no worse than last on the job queue, must have a greater
probability of employment and therefore greater utility the more considera-
tions other than seniority enter into employment decisions. A decrease
inlowers the expected utility of a given least senior worker, and
ceteris paribus causes the union to contract.
Thus, a sufficient though by no means necessary condition for the
seniority system to raise the wage is for it to effect an upward shift
in the VV curve. The voting, schedule shifts up if the initial median worker
experiences an increased probability of employment at a given wage when
decreases. This inturn requires that the probability of employment be a
concavefunctionof place in the job queue.
The reason as an foilows. From the perspective of the median worker,
the mean of his subjective probability distribution over his possible
locations in the job queue is L/2. This is true irrespective of the—19—
degree of reliance on seniority, and thus is perserved by charges in 5.
A decrease in (5 represents to the median worker a mean—preserving contraction
in the subjective distribution he holds over his job queue index. His
subjective probability of employment is thus raised by an decrease in (5
if and only if probability of employment is a convex function of level of
employment. Finally, if employment prospects are improved ceteris paribus,
then an upward adjustment in his most—preferred wage results.
The probability of employment function is given by B —w!p*f(j).
This is a linear and decreasing function of 1/f(j). Therefore, the probability
of employment function is convex if and only if the reciprocal of the marginal
product of labor function is concave. For the CES production function this
condition is easily interpretable. If a is the elasticity of output with
respect to labor, then a necessary and sufficient condition for l/f(j) con-
cave is a <11(1+a). Forsmall elasticities of substitution between
labor and the fixed factor the VV curve does shift upward in response to a
decrease in 5,andthe seniority system does increase the union wage.
Forthe CES case a bit more can be established. It can be shown that
for 1/(1 + a) <a<1,although the VV curve shifts downward as (5 decreases,
the net result of the shifts in both curves is nonetheless an increase .in
the equilibrium wage. We can conclude in such cases that the seniority system
does contribute to. wage sluggishness. Recall that when a <1the wage falls
to partially offset the fail is p*. It is thus established that the
responsiveness of theequilibrii. wage is greater the smeller is the role
played by the senioritysystem.Note that this result includes the Cobb—
Douglascase, for which the wage response under complete seniorityrule is
zero.— 20—
Formore general production functions the seniority system need
not be the correct explanation for the failure of union sector wages to
respond to international competition. Indeed, under conditions such that
the probability of employment of the median worker would increase signifi—
cantly were the seniority system to be abandoned, wage adjustment in the
direction of sectoral price changes is greater under the seniority system
than it would be otherwise.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have investigated the casual argument that majority
voting in unions and the seniority system together provide an explanation
for the failure of union wages to adjust in response to intensification
of international competition. In the context of a formal model of a small
union sector embedded in a two—sector economy I have shown that the
elasticity of the union sector wage with respect to changes in the inter-
national price of the sector's output depends critically on the production
technologyin that sector. Inthe Cobb—Douglas casethe long—run
equilibrium wage in the union sector is "endogenously sticky." A perhaps
surprisingresult is that when theelasticity of the marginal product of
laborschedule is a decreasing function of the level of employment a
decline in the international price of the union—sector good causes the
wage rate in that sector to rise.
The model was modified to allow the job queue to deviate from a
strict seniority ranking. By doing so I was able to isolate the role
played by the seniority system in the determination of the wage adjustment.
Sufficient conditions were derived under which greater reliance on the
seniority criterion for layoffs implies less wage responsiveness.— 21—
Welfarestatements do not follow immediately from the analysis.
Here I have been concerned solely with positive questions of the effect
of international competition on union wages, union size and sectoral
unemployment. But the potential scope for trade policy is evident, if the
market distortions described here accurately reflect aspects of the real
world. n advantage that the present formulation offers for studying trade
policy is its ability to incorporate the effects of anticipated government
intervention on the wage demands set by unions. The normative questions
are left for future rasearsch.FOOTNOTES
1.See, for example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974), Srinivasan and
Bhagwati (1975), Corden and Findlay (1975) and Khan (1980).
2.An exception is Calvo (1978). However, Calvo does not attemptto
explain industry wage stickiness, focusing instead on general
equilibriumresource allocation issues under the assumption that
unionsseek to maximizethe urban—rural wage differential.
3.The prototypical example of this occurence might be the United Auto
Workers settlement of 1979 when, amidst increased competition from
Japanese cars, the union negotiated a. wage pact calling for an
approximately 35% expected nominal wage increase which translated
to a small expected increase in real wages. At the time, the
industry unemployement:rate was in excess of fifteen percent.
4. It would be possible to model the bargaining process, as for example
do McDonald and Solow (1981), but that would add further complication,
and does not seem essential to the issues addressed hare.
5. See Hall and Lillian (1979) for an analysis of efficient bargains and
a discussion of conditions under which unilateral employment determina-
tionis likely to arise.
6.While thismobility assumption is somewhat extreme, it is quite
coon in the contract theory literature. See, for example, Azariadis
(1975) and Grossman and Hart (1981). It would be possible to relax
this assumption in a multi—period formulation, with only minor changes in
the results, if workers who leave the union to accept nonunion employment
lose their position in the seniority queue. The some workers who
are laid off will remain unemployed rather than leave the union sector
in order to protect their future rents to seniority.
7. In Grossman (1982) I investigate the conditions under which industry
unemployment is greater when a seniority system is operative relative
to that which results with a similar set of assumptions about union
behavior, but with the addition of other criteria for layoff decisions.
This is further discussed in Section IV below.
8.This assumption is consistent with the observation that wage gradients
in union sectors (and sectors with collective bargaining generally)
are flatter than those in nonunion sectors. See Blàch and Kuskin
(1978) and Freeman (1978).
9.See Blair and Crawford (1981) for more discussion of the existence of
a unique equilibrium in the context of the union voting problem.
10. Note that (5) does not imply the absence of a utility premium for
workers in a monopoly—union sector. Ex ante all workers except the
least senior have higher expected utility than that available in
the nonunion sector. And once the state of nature is realized,every
employed worker has higher utility than that available outside the
sector. Thus,the free entry assumption is not inconsistent with the
observation, by for example Abowd and Farber (1979), that union workers
earn a premium, or that there is often a queue for union jobs.11. This result would need to be modified if the unionized sector
were "large," so that the allocation of workers into or out of this
sector would affect labor's marginal product in the rest of the economy.
12. When =0the model of this section is exactly as in previous
sections. The maximum allowable value for d is L/2, in which case
all workers are identical, and each acts as if layoffs will be made
by random draw. This is effectively the model of union behavior
of McDonald and Solow (1981), Oswald (1981) and others.
13. Details are available from the author upon request.
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